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pollution regulation, especially in developing countries. 
Using data from China’s Green Watch program, this 
study extends previous research on performance rating 
and disclosure by considering firms’ perceptions of public 
and market responses to their ratings. The results suggest 
that the Green Watch has significantly increased market 
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with different stakeholders, while the firms with bad 
ratings are more likely to perceive deterioration. Among 
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The Impact of Environmental Performance Rating and Disclosure: An 













Key words: environmental performance rating and disclosure, developing country, China’s 
Green Watch Program 
                                                       
1 The authors are Assistant Professor of Rutgers University, Senior Economist of the World Bank and Senior Fellow 
of the Center for Global Development, respectively. The authors gratefully acknowledge support from Profs. Genfa 
Lu, Yuan Wang and Gangxi Xu for conducting the survey. Views expressed in the paper are solely of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they 





Environmental performance rating and disclosure (PRD) has emerged as a substitute or 
complement for traditional pollution regulation, especially in developing countries (Tietenberg, 
1998; Dasgupta et al., 2006; Porney, 2000). Indonesia’s PROPER (Program for Pollution 
Control, Evaluation and Rating), initiated in June 1995, was the first PRD program in developing 
countries. Because of its overall success, as measured by reduced emissions at a lower regulatory 
cost, many countries have established similar programs that are tailored to diverse economic, 
institutional and cultural settings. These programs include the Philippines’ EcoWatch, India’s 
Green Rating Project, China’s Green Watch, Vietnam’s Green Bamboo, Ghana’s EPRD, and 
Ukraine’s PRIDE. PRD programs are particularly attractive for developing countries because 
institutional weaknesses hinder conventional monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws, 
regulations, and standards (Foulon et al., 2002), and because PRD programs have lower 
regulatory costs (Dasgupta et al., 2006; Garcia et al., 2009).  
PRD programs can be successful under two conditions.  First, relevant parties - regulatory 
agencies, consumers, investors, communities and non-profit organizations (NGOs), - may react 
to firms’ environmental performance, creating potential pressure on polluting firms. Second, 
firms must actually respond to this pressure by improving their environmental performance. The 
literature on PRD programs, mainly focused on empirical tests of the second condition, falls into 
two groups.  The first compares the environmental performance ratings of firms before and after 
a program and ascribes improvement in environmental ratings to the program (Afsah et al 1997; 
Wang et al. 2004; Garcia et al. 2009).  However, this approach may be confounded by time-
varying factors such as technology improvements. The second group compares pollution levels 
between rated and unrated firms, and credits better environmental performance of rated firms to   3
the program.  However, this approach may be confounded by selection bias (e.g., firms with 
better environmental performance may be more likely to be rated).   
It is rare to have pollution data for both rated and unrated firms before and after a PRD 
program.  Garcia et al. (2007 and 2009) are the researchers to address the effect of a PRD – 
Indonesia’s PROPER -- on the measured pollution of rated and unrated firms, both ex ante and 
ex post. Their 2007 study suggests that PROPER has reduced emissions intensity, with a 
particularly rapid and strong impact on firms that have a poor initial compliance record.  The 
2009 study finds a strong reactive response during the first six months of disclosure, followed by 
a more moderate, but still significant, longer-run response as management adjusts to the new 
regime. 
Using data from China’s Green Watch program, this study extends previous research on 
PRDs by considering firms’ perceptions of public and market responses to their ratings. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, focusing 
on the role of PRD programs in developing countries.  Section 3 describes China’s Green Watch 
program, while Section 4 describes our survey instrument and provides descriptive statistics for 
major variables.  Section 5 presents our estimation model and results. Section 6 summarizes and 
concludes the paper.    
 
2.   Previous Research 
The literature on pollution control includes extensive work on command-and-control, 
market-based and information-based instruments (Tietenberg 1998; Dasgupta et al. 2006; Garcia 
et al. 2007).  Command-and-control instruments are often inefficient and ineffective in 
developing countries, because firms fail to report adequately, regulators lack the technical and 
administrative capacity for effective monitoring and enforcement, and judicial systems are weak   4
and/or corrupt.  These same weaknesses limit regulators’ ability to employ market-based 
instruments, which also work less effectively in countries where market failures are common and 
legal and institutional support for formal market activities is weak.    
Information-based instruments can be effective in developing countries where strong 
regulatory institutions and/or well-developed markets are absent.  In practice, diverse 
information programs have served as complements to command-and-control and market-based 
instruments (Kleindorfer and Orts 1998).  They reduce the information asymmetry between 
polluters and environmental stakeholders (consumers, communities, NGOs, investors), 
empowering these stakeholders to pressure polluters for improved environmental performance 
(Bui and Mayer 2003; Kennedy, Laplante and Maxwell 1994; Oberholzer-Gee and Mitsunari 
2006).  When implemented correctly, information instruments promote better interaction and 
dialogue among firms, stakeholders and regulators (Garcia et al. 2007).  
Information instruments also leverage markets in significant ways.  An extensive empirical 
literature suggests that disclosure of firms’ bad environmental performance reduces their stock 
prices both in developed countries (Foulon et al., 2002; Hamilton, 1995; Konar and Cohen, 1997; 
Khanna et al., 1998; Lanoie et al., 1998) and developing countries such as Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico, and the Philippines (Dasgupta et al., 2001).  Jackson (2001) and Boyle and Kiel (2001) 
review the impact of disclosure on housing prices, which are found to be lower near Superfund 
sites (Kohlase, 1991; Reichert, 1999), hazardous waste sites (Thayer et al., 1992), non-hazardous 
landfills (Michaels and Smith, 1990), nuclear radiation sources (Gamble and Downing, 1992), 
and polluting manufacturing plants (Hanna, 2007).  Housing prices also respond to publicized 
environmental contamination incidents (Kiel, 1995; Kiel and McClain, 1995).      5
Information instruments have diverse forms, including reports of measured pollution, 
environmental accident reports, and environmental performance ratings.  In the US, for example, 
the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) discloses toxic chemical releases and waste management 
activities by significant toxic polluters and federal facilities.  In developing countries, however, 
weak regulatory institutions may have much greater difficulty in implementing such emissions 
inventories.  In addition, despite an emerging literature on stakeholders’ role in improving firms’ 
environmental performance (Arora and Cason, 1998; Blackman and Bannister, 1998; Pargal and 
Wheeler, 1996; Wheeler et al., 1997), concerns remain about the public’s ability to understand 
and utilize complex emissions reports.  For example, Bui and Mayer (2003) find that the release 
of TRI’s highly-detailed information on facilities’ toxic emissions has virtually no effect on 
housing prices in neighboring areas, even when the release is unexpected.  The dual problems of 
emissions inventories in developing countries – technical feasibility and public understanding – 
have led to a preference for programs that condense complex information into environmental 
performance ratings that are disclosed to the public.     
Research on the effectiveness of performance rating and disclosure (PRD) programs suggests 
that that have a significant, positive impact on regulatory compliance (Afash et al., 1997; 
Dasgupta et al., 2006; Garcia et al., 2007, 2009; Wang et al., 2004). Dasgupta et al. (2006) 
summarize the changes in compliance rates for several PRD programs in Asia:  One and two 
years after the inception of a PRD,  compliance rates increased from 37% to 61% in Indonesia, 
8% to 58% in the Philippines, 10% to 24% in Vietnam, 75% to 85% in Zhenjiang, China and 
23% to 62% in Hohhot, China.  
Several empirical studies also find that PRD programs have improved firms’ environmental 
performance in Indonesia (Afash et al., 1997; Garcia et al., 2007, 2009) and China (Wang et al.,   6
2004).  However, data constraints generally limit these studies to comparisons of environmental 
ratings before and after program implementation, or comparisons of compliance status between 
rated and unrated firms.  Unfortunately, intertemporal rating comparisons are subject to 
confounding effects from time-varying factors such as technology change, while cross-sectional 
comparisons can be subject to significant selection bias.   
 
3.  China’s Green Watch Program 
Despite long-standing efforts to control pollution with traditional regulatory instruments, 
China continues to have severe pollution problems.  This has led China’s State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA) to test the effectiveness of environmental performance rating 
and disclosure in a program supported by the World Bank.  In 1999, SEPA launched its Green 
Watch program in Zhenjiang City, Jiangsu Province and Hohhot City, Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous District.  Zhenjiang implemented a relatively complex rating system, as shown in   
Figure 1, while Hohhot used a simpler rating system that was suited to its lower level of 
economic and institutional development (Wang et al., 2004).  As shown in  Figure 1, Green 
Watch rates firms’ environmental performance from best to worst in five colors – green for 
superior performance, blue for full compliance, yellow for meeting major compliance standards 
but violating some minor requirements, red for violating important standards, and black for more 
extreme non-compliance.   
The first Green Watch ratings were disclosed through the media in 1999.  The program was 
extended from Zhenjiang to the entire Jiangsu Province in 2001, and to eight other provinces 
during 2003-2005.  Nationwide implementation of Green Watch has been promoted since 2005.    
Overall, the available evidence suggests a positive impact for the program.  Table 1 shows that in 
Zhenjiang, the percentage of firms with positive ratings (green, blue and yellow) increased from   7
75% in 1999 to 85% in 2000.  The most significant changes were in the extremely-noncompliant 
black group, whose percentage dropped from 11% in 1999 to 2% in 2000, and a major shift from 
the partially-compliant yellow group (44% to 22%) to the fully-compliant blue group (27% to 
61%).  
Evidence for the Green Watch program throughout Jiangsu Province indicates both 
increasing participation by firms and improvement in their compliance rates.  As shown in Table 
1, the number of rated firms increased more than tenfold, from 1,059 in 2001 to 11,215 in 2006; 
and the percentage of firms with positive ratings (green, blue, and yellow) increased from 83% in 
2001 to 90% in 2006.  Furthermore, Table 1 suggests that Green Watch ratings provide a strong 
improvement incentive for noncompliant (red and black) firms, with stronger effects on firms 
with red ratings (moderate noncompliance) than those with black ratings (extreme 
noncompliance). 
 
4.  Survey Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The results reported in this paper are drawn from a 2002 survey of managers of firms rated 
by Green Watch in four cities in Jiangsu Province of China:  Huaian, Wuxi, Yangzhou, and 
Zhenjiang.  Following the success of the pilot program in Zhenjiang, Huaian, Wuxi and 
Yangzhou adopted the same program in 2001.  Table 2 provides information on socioeconomic 
and environmental conditions in the four cities, as well as polluting emissions in 2001.  Wuxi has 
the largest population as well as the highest GDP per capita, while Huaian is the poorest.  Wuxi 
and Yangzhou have the lowest readings for air quality, measured by SO2 (sulfur dioxide) and 
NO2 (nitrogen dioxide), and water quality measured by TSS (total suspended solids) and 
regulatory compliance percentage.      8
We used the same format to conduct the surveys in all four cities in late 2002.  The municipal 
environmental bureau of each city convened meetings of managers from all rated firms.  During 
the meetings, the managers were asked to anonymously complete the questionnaires 
administered by the research team.  Of 344 rated firms, the managers of 225 firms attended the 
meetings and completed the questionnaires.  Among those 225 firms, 71 had their first Green 
Watch ratings assigned in 2000, 76 in 2001 and 78 in 2002.  Across the four cities, Huaian had 
41 firms surveyed, Wuxi 21, Yangzhou 45 and Zhenjiang 118. 
The survey questionnaire has six sections that ask for managers’ socio-demographic 
information; perceptions of local environmental conditions; their firms’ relationships with 
different stakeholders; actions undertaken to control pollution and improve environmental 
performance in the previous year; general understanding of and experience with the Green 
Watch Program; and  perceptions of the changes in their firm’s market value, competitiveness, , 
and relationships with different stakeholders that were attributable to Green Watch.  Appendix A 
lists the major survey questions on perceived changes by the firm managers. A complete survey 
is available upon request.   
Table 3 summarizes the managers’ responses.  Wuxi, the highest-income city, has the 
lowest rating for overall environmental conditions (36.7 out of 100), while Haian is rated 67.7, 
Zhengjiang 70.7, and Yangzhou 74.2.  Managers of large firms dominate the ratings in Wuxi, 
with 57% of responses, while managers of medium firms have greater representation in the other 
cities.  State-owned enterprises predominate, except in Yangzhou.  Private, foreign, and joint 
venture companies are all significantly represented.  In Wuxi, rated firms are concentrated in the 
textile industry and located in zones with a mixture of industrial, commercial and residential 
activity.  In Yangzhou, firms in the mechanical and electric manufacturing industry have the   9
greatest representation (33%).  More than half of the rated firms in Huaian, Yangzhou, and 
Zhenjiang are focused on the domestic market, while a higher proportion of rated firms in Wuxi 
are export-oriented.  The surveyed managers have similar characteristics across the four cities:  
predominately males in their 40s, with 12-13 years of schooling and more than a decade of 
employment in their current jobs.   
Figure 2 provides information on managers’ perceptions of the relationship between Green 
Watch ratings and measures of market value and competitiveness.  Gains in market value are 
perceived by 75% of the managers whose firms got the highest rating (green), but less than 20% 
of the managers whose firms got the lowest rating (black).  Among managers of black-rated 
firms, one-third perceive a loss of international competitiveness, while the other managers see no 
change in international status.  The majority of red-rated firms perceive no change or a loss in 
international competitiveness.  On the other hand, almost none of the firms rated blue or green 
perceive a loss in competiveness, while the majority perceive an improvement.  Similar patterns 
characterize perceptions of firms’ competitiveness in the domestic market:  80% of black-rated 
firms perceive their domestic competitiveness as unchanged or reduced, while 75% of green-
rated firms perceive a gain.    
Figure 2 also suggests a positive relationship between ratings and relationships with 
stakeholders.  Two-thirds of the green-rated firms perceive an improved relationship with 
regulatory agencies, in contrast to 20% of the firms rated black and 42% of those rated red.  A 
similar pattern holds for relationships with neighboring communities:  Improvements are 
perceived by 0% for black-rated firms, 21% for red; 8% for yellow, 18% for blue, and 42% for 
green.  Similar patterns emerge for relationships with NGOs, the media, industry associations   10
and financial institutions.  In the latter case, percentages who perceive improvements are, by 
color:  red 5%, yellow 18%, blue 37% and green 58%.    
 
5.  Multivariate Analysis 
5.1  Estimation Model 
While descriptive statistics are interesting and suggestive, more insight can be gained from a 
multivariate approach.  In this section, we specify and estimate a set of reduced-form equations 
that control for the attributes of firms, managers and locations.  To illustrate our approach, we 
specify competitiveness in the domestic market for firm i, denotedZi *, as a latent variable that is 
affected by the firm’s publicly-disclosed environmental performance rating, as well as other firm 
and location characteristics.  The manager’s characteristics also enter, because they may affect 
perceptions of the firm’s competitiveness.  For firm i in city j, we specify competitiveness as 
(1)   i Zi      R β C β M β F β i 4 j 3 i 2 i 1 * , 
where Fi, Mi, and Cj are vectors of characteristics of the firm, the manager, and the city. Ri is a 
vector of the five color ratings. The coefficient vectors are denoted by β’s, while  εij  is a random 
error term that follows a Weilbull distribution.  
  
While the firm’s competitiveness cannot be observed, we do observe the  manager’s choice 
among three survey alternatives, deteriorated, no change, and improved, that are respectively 
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The U’s are unknown parameters to be estimated with the β’s. The probability of the manager of 












































where Wi = β1 Fi + β2 Mi + β3 Ci + β4 Ri. Given the nonlinear nature of equation (3), the 
marginal effects of the regressors that are continous variables (X = [F, M, C, R]) on the 
probabilities are 
 









Equation (4) suggests that the marginal effects of the continuous regressors have opposite 
signs from the coefficients of the regressors.  Since some of the key regressors are dummy 
variables, we provide an interpretive illustration for environmental performance ratings.  Assume 
that the yellow color rating is used as a base. The marginal effect of receiving a red color rating 
is the difference in the probability Pik for k = 1, 2, and 3 resulting from the color change from 
yellow to red, while keeping other regressors constant at their sample means.  
The same ordered logit model can be applied to analyze the perceived changes in firms’ 
market value, and relationships with different stakeholders.   
 
5.2  Results 
We have applied our ordered logit model to 10 indicators for firms: overall market value, 
competitiveness, and relationships with different stakeholders.  In each model, the dependent   12
variable has three categorical values 1, 2 and 3, indicating perceived deterioration, no change, or 
improvement on each measure.  The regressors include managers’ characteristics (gender, age, 
year of schooling, and tenure), firms’ attributes (ownership, size, sector, zoning, and market 
concentration); city characteristics (measured by attribute dummies and overall environmental 
conditions); and color ratings.  
Tables 4 and 5 report our estimation results.  Controlling for the characteristics of firms, 
cities and managers, we find that corporate environmental performance ratings are statistically 
significant in the majority of the models.  We calculate marginal effects for the probabilities that 
a managers states a deterioration (k = 1) or improvement (k = 3) for each variable.  Since 
performance ratings are categorical, the marginal effect is measured by the difference in the 
probability when a color rating dummy changes from zero to one.  As our base for estimation, 
we use firms rated yellow (complying with the majority of regulatory standards but failing to 
meet some minor standards).  The marginal effect of a particular color rating (e.g. green) is the 
probability change when the rating changes from yellow (the base) to that color.  Table 6 
summarizes the marginal effects of the color ratings on each measure.  
Relative to yellow-rated firms, the probability of perceiving a gain in market value decreases 
by 20 percent points for red-rated firms, at the 1% level of statistical significance.
i In contrast, 
the probability of perceiving a gain increases by 27% points for blue firms and 68% for green 
firms.  For international competitiveness, firms rated blue and green experience a decrease of 6-
7% in perceived deterioration, in contrast to increases in perceived improvement of 24% for blue 
firms and 46% for green firms.  On the other hand, the probability of perceived improvement in 
international competitiveness decreases by 16% for black firms and 37% for red firms, while the   13
probability of perceived deterioration increases by 22% for red firms. We find similar results for 
firms’ competitiveness in the domestic market, and within their own industries.  
Corporate environmental performance ratings also influence firms’ relationships with 
different stakeholders. A green rating increases the probability of perceiving an improved 
relationship with environmental agencies by 44%, NGOs by 23%, and industry associations by 
18%, while also decreasing the probability of a deteriorated relationship with environmental 
agencies (1%), communities (18%), NGOs (15%), the media (24%) and industry associations 
(13%).  The direction of blue impacts is similar, but the estimated marginal impacts are much 
smaller.  In this context, we should note that two rules applied in Jiangsu Province may also 
affect the differential impacts of blue and green ratings:  (a) Enterprises awarded green in a 
particular year can be given priority consideration in the selection of best-performance enterprise 
activities; and (b) an enterprise that has won green for three consecutive years is given 
preferential status by provincial regulators. 
Our results indicate the opposite effects for bad performers.  A black rating decreases the 
probability of perceiving an improved relationship with communities (10% less), NGOs and the 
media (7%), industry associations (5%), and financial markets (21%).  Red-rated firms are less 
likely to perceive an improved relationship with industry associations (4% less) and financial 
markets (20%), while they have a higher probability of perceiving a deteriorated relationship 
with financial markets (6% more).  
Overall, one notable finding is that corporate environmental performance ratings are more 
likely to have statistically significant impacts on market value and market competitiveness than 
on relationships with stakeholders.  This suggests that in China, at least, markets may be a more 
powerful determinant of rating impacts than communities, NGOs and the media.   14
       
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we report survey-based results for firms’ experiences with China’s Green 
Watch programs in four cities of Jiangsu Province.  The results suggest that Green Watch has 
significantly increased market and stakeholder pressure on managers to improve their firms’ 
environmental performance.  More specifically, controlling for the characteristics of locations, 
firms, and individual managers, we find that firms with better ratings perceive positive impacts 
on market competitiveness, overall market value, and relationships with different stakeholders, 
while the firms with bad ratings are more likely to perceive deterioration.  Among these factors, 
managers perceive a more active role for markets than for stakeholder relations.      15
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Table 1. Firms’ Environmental Performance Ratings by the Green Watch Program in Jiangsu 
Province, China  





































































































Figures inside parentheses are percents of the firms rated in particular color.  
Source: The rating information of the pilot program in Zhenjiang is obtained from Wang et al. 
(2004). Legislative Affair Office of the China State Council (2007) provides the rating 
information of the province-wide Green Watch Program in Jiangsu province in 2001-2006 
(available at http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/dfxx/dffzxx/js/200706/20070600021431.shtml; 
last assess on May 19, 2009).  
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Table 2. City Comparisons on socio-economic and environmental conditions as well as industrial 
pollution emissions of 2001 
        
   Huaian Wuxi Yangzhou  Zhenjiang 
Socio-economic conditions        
  GDP per capita (Yuan)  14,359 37,700 21,311  18,852
  Economic growth rate (%)  11.05 12.20 7.30 11.10
  Unemployment rate (%)  3.84 3.62 3.60 2.30
  Population (1,000)  558 2,131 1,097 628
Environmental conditions   
  TSS: Total suspend solids (mg / m3)  0.158 0.144 0.237  0.105
  SO2: sulfur dioxide  (mg / m3)  0.037 0.056 0.023  0.024
  NO2: nitrogen dioxide (mg / m3)  0.027 0.034 0.035  0.038
  % of drinking water meeting standards  93.00 97.96 98.80  96.43
  % of surface water meeting standards  83.00 91.67 62.00  88.89
  Noise (dB(A))  55.80 56.90 53.20  55.50
Total industrial pollution emission   
  waste water (10,000 ton)  1674 14010 3774  4544
  COD (ton)  1708 N.A. 6787  25200
  Waste gas (100 million m
3) 129 471 461  1895
  Smoke (ton)  11063 8611 5385  47421
  SO2 (ton)  8863 21492 35765  96377
  solid waste (10,000 ton)  1 8  N.A.  265
Source: Municipal governments of the four cities.     20
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of characteristics of cities, firms, and managers in the sample   
 Huaian  Wuxi  Yangzhou Zhenjiang  Total 
No. of observations  41  21  45  118  225 
Overall envi. conditions
 a 67.68  66.81  74.22  70.69  70.48 
Firm characteristics 
Age (years)  31.02  36.00  35.98  25.33  29.49 
Firm size (%)           
  big   14.63  57.14  30.23  15.38  22.07 
  medium    46.34  42.86  51.16  48.72  48.20 
  Small  39.02  0.00  18.60  35.90  29.73 
Ownership (%)           
  State-owned  46.34  52.38  28.89  37.29  38.67 
  Collectively owned  9.76  0.00  11.11  15.25  12.00 
  Private  19.51  9.52  8.89  14.41  13.78 
  Foreign  2.44  0.00  0.00  5.93  3.56 
  Joint venture  7.32  23.81  17.78  19.49  17.33 
  Others  14.63  14.29  33.33  7.63  14.67 
Sector (%)           
  Mechanical & electric  13.16  23.81  33.33  24.79  24.31 
  Textile  13.16  42.86  16.67  7.69  13.76 
  Chemical  10.58  9.52  2.38  12.82  10.09 
  Utility  5.26  0.00  2.38  5.13  4.13 
  Food & beverage  13.16  4.76  7.14  4.27  6.42 
  Others  44.74  19.05  38.10  45.30  41.28 
Zoning (I = industrial; C = commercial; L = Living) (%) 
  I  30.00  14.29  33.33  43.22  36.16 
  I + C + L  45.00  66.67  51.11  43.22  47.32 
  Without I   25.00  19.05  15.56  13.56  16.52 
Major market (%)           
  Domestic   60.98  42.86  59.09  61.21  59.01 
  Export  21.95  33.33  22.73  25.00  24.77 
  Domestic + export  17.07  23.81  18.18  13.79  16.22 
Managers’ characteristics 
Gender (%)  92.68  80.95  82.22  90.68  88.44 
Age (years)  44.73  39.00  43.71  44.42  43.83 
Schooling (years)  13.02  13.05  13.73  12.55  12.92 
Tenure (years)  16.85  14.38  18.84  13.27  15.14 
a The managers’ perceptions of overall environmental quality is on a scale from one (the worst) 
to 100 (the best).   21
 
Table 4. Estimation results on the impact of environmental performance ratings on firm 
competitiveness, market value, and internal environmental management 
 market  competitiveness  Overall 
market 







color rating dummies (base = yellow)     
   black  -0.70**  -1.19  0.76**  0.5 
 (0.34)  (1.62)  (0.32)  (1.93) 
   red  -1.94***  -1.58***  -1.72***  -1.37* 
 (0.35)  (0.28)  (0.30)  (0.71) 
   blue  1.04***  0.98***  1.01***  1.50*** 
 (0.24)  (0.34)  (0.36)  (0.34) 
   green  2.31***  1.97*  1.47  3.55*** 
 (0.38)  (1.02)  (0.90)  (0.75) 
City characteristics 
   local envi. cond. 
  
0.01*** 0.01  0.00  -0.01*** 
0.00   (0.01)  (0.01)  0.00  
   city dummies (base = Wuxi)     
      Huaian  -0.37  -0.62***  2.44***  -0.85*** 
 (0.38)  (0.21)  (0.29)  (0.09) 
      Yangzhou  -0.05  -0.45**  -0.56  -1.37*** 
 (0.47)  (0.18)  (0.34)  (0.30) 
      Zhenjiang  -0.28  0.24***  -0.27*  -0.69*** 
 (0.39)  (0.08)  (0.17)  (0.21) 
Managers' characteristics 
   male   0.34  0.31  0.19  0.38 
 (0.25)  (0.44)  (0.19)  (0.67) 
   age (years)  0  0  -0.01  -0.01 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
   years of schooling   0.08**  0.08**  0.01  0.01 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
   tenure (years)  0.02  0.02**  0.03  0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
                        Firm characteristics 
   ownership (base = State owned)     
      Collective  -0.22  -0.39*  0.16  -0.56 
 (0.84)  (0.23)  (0.27)  (0.44) 
      Private  0.15  0.31  0.63  -0.15 
 (1.21)  (0.65)  (0.52)  (0.53) 
      joint venture  0.35  0.06  0.05  -0.90**   22
 (0.64)  (0.38)  (0.42)  (0.36) 
      Foreign invested  -0.02  -0.02  0.24  0.4 
 (0.86)  (0.40)  (0.44)  (0.43) 
      Others  1.15  1.65*  1.81*  1.47** 
 (0.92)  (0.85)  (1.02)  (0.59) 
   firm size         
      medium  0.80*  -0.12  0.47*  0.43 
 (0.46)  (0.21)  (0.28)  (0.35) 
      small  0.55  0.54*  0.37  0.83*** 
 (0.50)  (0.29)  (0.37)  (0.23) 
   firm age (years)  0  -0.01**  -0.01***  -0.01 
  (0.01)  0.00   0.00   (0.01) 
      textile  -0.45  -0.55  -0.24  0.06 
 (0.73)  (0.46)  (0.56)  (0.62) 
      chemical  0.07  0.02  -0.11  0.32** 
 (0.63)  (0.48)  (0.79)  (0.13) 
      utility   -2.28***  -0.24  -0.47  -1.16 
 (0.29)  (0.47)  (0.82)  (1.31) 
      food & beverage  0.19  0.99*  -0.68*  -0.52 
 (0.50)  (0.58)  (0.39)  (0.39) 
      others  0.41  0.29  0.38  -0.04 
 (0.99)  (0.84)  (0.67)  (0.09) 
   zoning of a firm (base = industrial zone)   
      commercial+ind.+ living  0.55***  0.56*  0.32**  0.01 
 (0.19)  (0.33)  (0.13)  (0.35) 
      No industry  1.48**  0.81***  0.76***  0.73 
 (0.69)  (0.24)  (0.26)  (0.47) 
   major market (base = domestic)     
      export  0.23  0.22  0.23  -0.54 
 (0.16)  (0.48)  (0.62)  (0.41) 
     domestic+export  0.77***  0.77**  0.22  -0.89*** 
 (0.22)  (0.31)  (0.27)  (0.23) 
cutoff 1 (U1) 1.33***  -0.23  -2.09  -5.28*** 
 (0.46)  (0.61)  (1.28)  (1.37) 
cutoff 2 (U2) 4.28***  3.36***  1.21  0.62 
 (0.59)  (0.51)  (1.17)  (1.26) 
R-squared 0.19  0.16  0.20  0.19 
No. of observations  127  199  213  214 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations of the estimated coefficients. Asterisks, ***, **, 
and *, represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.  
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Table 5. Estimation results of the impact of environmental performance ratings on firms’ 
relationships with different stakeholders 
  Firms’ relationship with different stakeholders 
 
Envi. 





color rating dummies (base = yellow)       
   black  -1.70  -1.67  -2.83**  -1.65  -1.79  -2.17 
 (1.99)  (1.45)  (1.36)  (1.46)  (1.36)  (1.59) 
   red  0.54  -0.11  -0.47  0.37  -1.08*  -1.63*** 
 (0.37)  (0.90)  (0.89)  (0.45)  (0.58)  (0.20) 
   blue  0.41***  0.88  0.99  1.49***  0.28  1.04*** 
 (0.10)  (0.61)  (0.67)  (0.34)  (0.69)  (0.35) 
   green  1.88*  1.5  1.78***  2.03*  1.66***  1.16 
 (0.97)  (0.93)  (0.61)  (1.09)  (0.60)  (1.14) 
City characteristics  
   local envi. cond.  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
   city dummies (base = Wuxi)         
      Huaian  -1.26***  0.64*  -0.92*  -0.93*** 0.63  -0.97*** 
 (0.43)  (0.39)  (0.54)  (0.32)  (0.48)  (0.20) 
      Yangzhou  -0.83**  0.92*  -0.1  -0.24  0.93**  -1.42*** 
 (0.38)  (0.53)  (0.48)  (0.36)  (0.41)  (0.15) 
      Zhenjiang  -1.20**  0.83**  -0.32  -0.78  0.44  -0.71*** 
 (0.53)  (0.34)  (0.62)  (0.48)  (0.45)  (0.21) 
Managers' characteristics 
   male   -0.21***  0.34***  0.42  1.03***  1.28***  0.38 
 (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.55)  (0.22)  (0.14)  (0.61) 
   age (years)  0  -0.02  -0.01  0  -0.01  -0.05** 
 (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
   years of schooling   -0.02  -0.03**  -0.02  0.02  0.03  0.01 
 (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
   tenure (years)  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  0.02 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
Firm characteristics 
   ownership (base = State owned)       
      Collective  -0.09  0.96***  0.32**  -0.05  0.72***  -0.81 
 (0.18)  (0.29)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.88) 
      Private  0.05  0.85  0.22  -0.29  0.24  0.2 
 (0.62)  (0.90)  (0.88)  (0.89)  (0.51)  (0.37) 
      Joint venture  0.34  0.57**  0.36  0.77  1.55***  -1.02*** 
 (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.34)  (0.68)  (0.54)  (0.28) 
      Foreign invested  0.27  0.69  0.51  0.35  1.38***  0.37   24
 (0.24)  (0.51)  (0.48)  (0.36)  (0.14)  (0.48) 
      Others   0.22  1.02  1.05  1.00*  1.66***  0.89 
 (0.58)  (0.76)  (0.70)  (0.58)  (0.64)  (0.66) 
   firm size (base = large)           
      Medium  0.84*  0.45  0.93***  1.20***  0.93***  -0.74** 
 (0.43)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.40)  (0.15)  (0.35) 
      Small   0.95  0.36  1.35***  1.46***  1.13***  0.01 
 (0.68)  (0.33)  (0.43)  (0.46)  (0.29)  (0.24) 
   firm age (years)  0.01  -0.01**  0  -0.02*** -0.01  -0.02 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  0.00    (0.01)  (0.02) 
   sector dummies (base = mechanical and electrical manufacturer) 
      Textile  -0.29  -0.67  -0.53  -0.81*  -1.14*  0.03 
 (0.79)  (0.48)  (0.86)  (0.45)  (0.62)  (0.58) 
      chemical  0.65  -0.92  0.56  0.29  0.24  -0.3 
 (0.54)  (0.66)  (0.53)  (0.46)  (0.42)  (0.45) 
      utility   1.66  -1.70**  -1.29**  -0.54  -1.86***  -0.19 
 (1.21)  (0.81)  (0.52)  (0.61)  (0.63)  (1.72) 
      food & beverage  -1.43**  -0.44  0.24  0.14  -0.59  0.25 
 (0.70)  (0.56)  (0.55)  (0.61)  (0.58)  (0.36) 
      Others  0.06  -0.41  -0.5  -0.19  -0.32  0.06 
 (0.17)  (0.58)  (0.42)  (0.27)  (0.24)  (0.42) 
   zoning of a firm (base = industrial zone)     
      commercial + 
+industry +  living  -0.21  -0.68**  -0.57  -0.46  -0.33***  0.22 
 (0.49)  (0.32)  (0.76)  (0.71)  (0.09)  (0.35) 
      zone without 
industry 0.32  -0.83  -0.99  -0.43  -0.35  0.43 
 (0.39)  (0.70)  (0.86)  (0.78)  (0.84)  (0.43) 
   major market (base = domestic)       
      Export  0.49  -0.46**  -0.2  0.34  0.1  -0.18 
 (0.32)  (0.23)  (0.29)  (0.33)  (0.35)  (0.37) 
      Domestic+export  0.48  0.3  0.56  1.14***  0.66  0.72 
 (0.57)  (0.35)  (0.39)  (0.25)  (0.44)  (0.55) 
cutoff 1 (U1) -4.28***  -1.91  -2.30**  -0.26  -1.91  -6.25** 
 (1.07)  (1.58)  (1.15)  (1.88)  (1.75)  (2.49) 
cutoff 2 (U2) 0.99  1.28  1.85  3.16*  2.57*  -1.02 
 (1.30)  (1.64)  (1.23)  (1.72)  (1.54)  (2.33) 
R-squared 0.084  0.158  0.163  0.181  0.226  0.177 
No. of observations  212  212  212  211  212  213 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations of the estimated coefficients. Asterisks, ***, **, 
and *, represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.    25  26
Table 6. Marginal effects of corporate environmental performance ratings based on the ordered logit model controlling for 
characteristics of firms, managers, and cities (base color rating = yellow) 



















Marginal effect on the probability that firm managers indicate an deterioration (k = 1) 
Black 0.00  0.05  0.07  -0.02
*   0.04  0.38  0.60
** 0.39  0.36  0.11 
  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.01)  (0.08) (0.34) (0.24)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.17) 
Red 0.02  0.22
** 0.10
* 0.10
***   0.00  0.02 0.07  -0.07  0.18  0.06
*** 






* -0.17 -0.15  -0.32
*** -0.04  -0.02 











  (0.00)   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)     (0.00) (0.07) (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Marginal effect on the probability that firm managers indicate an improvement (k = 3) 
Black  0.11 -0.16
** -0.25 0.17











***   0.13  -0.01 -0.03  0.03  -0.04
*** -0.20
*** 



















  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.18)  (0.20) (0.13)  (0.23)  (0.09)  (0.28) 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations of the marginal effects. Asterisks, ***, **, and *, represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively.    27

















Source: Revised based on Figure 1 in Wang et al. (2004). 
 
Comply with concentration standards
Hazardous waste disposal = 100%









































Figure 2. Distribution of the perceived changes in firms’ overall market value, market 
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Note: The green, gray and red bars respectively represent one of the three options that the firm 
managers indicated -- green for “improvement”, gray for “no change” and “red” for 
“deterioration.” The vertical axis represents the percentage of the firm managers who report the 
perceived change for each category (improved, no change, or deteriorated). The horizontal axis 
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Appendix A: Major Survey Questions on the Perceived Changes of Green Watch ratings on 
Firms (the full survey is available upon request) 
1.  How does your firm’s Green Watch rating affect its competitiveness in the international 
markets (please choose (6) if your firms has no international business)? 
(1) Strongly decrease 
(2) Slightly decrease 
(3) No change 
(4) slightly increase 
(5) Greatly increase 
(6) No international business 
 
2.  How does your firm’s Green Watch rating affect its competitiveness in the domestic market 
(please choose (6) if your firm has no domestic business)? 
(1) Strongly decrease 
(2) Slightly decrease 
(3) No change 
(4) slightly increase 
(5) Greatly increase 
(6) No domestic business 
 
3.  How does your firms’ Green Watch rating affect its competitiveness within the industry? 
(1) strongly decrease 
(2) slightly decrease 
(3) no change 
(4) slightly increase 
(5) greatly increase 
 
4.  How does  your firms’ Green Watch rating affect its overall market value? 
(1) Strongly decrease 
(2) Slightly decrease 
(3) No change 
(4) Slightly increase 
(5) Greatly increase 
 
5.  How does  your firms’ Green Watch rating affect its relationship with financial markets? 
(1) Greatly deteriorated 
(2) Slightly deteriorated 
(3) No change 
(4) Slightly improved 
(5) Greatly improved 
 
6.  Is your firm’s relationship with environmental authorities affected by its Green Watch rating?  
(1) Greatly deteriorated 
(2) Slightly deteriorated 
(3) No change   31
(4) Slightly improved 
(5) Greatly improved 
 
7.  Is your firms’ relationship with local communities affected by its Green Watch rating? 
(1) Greatly deteriorated 
(2) Slightly deteriorated 
(3) No change 
(4) Slightly improved 
(5) Greatly improved 
 
8.  Is your firms’ relationship with industrial associations affected by its Green Watch rating? 
(1) Greatly deteriorated 
(2) Slightly deteriorated 
(3) No change 
(4) Slightly improved 
(5) Greatly improved 
 
9.  Is your firms’ relationship with environmental non-profit organizations affected by its Green 
Watch rating? 
(1) Greatly deteriorated 
(2) Slightly deteriorated 
(3) No change 
(4) Slightly improved 
(5) Greatly improved 
 
10. Is your firms’ relationship with media affected by its Green Watch rating? 
(1) Greatly deteriorated 
(2) Slightly deteriorated 
(3) No change 
(4) Slightly improved 




i All percentage figures in the rest of the paper refer to percent points.  